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EFFECT UPON A LEASE OF A REAL ESTATE
MORTGAGE FORECLOSURE
This discussion will be confined to those jurisdictions adopting
the lien theory of mortgages. Many of the questions involved are
regulated wholly or partly by statute, so there will be no attempt
to make a critical comparison of the rules in the various states. To
determine what rule will be followed in any particular state, its
statutes should be compared with those existing in the states m
which decisions have been reported.
I. WHEN THE LEASE IS PRIOR TO THE MORTGAGE
When the lease is executed prior to the mortgage, and is duly
recorded, the mortgage is subject to the lease. Foreclosure will
not affect the lease in any way, and the lessee is entitled to posses-
sion even after the period of redemption has expired.' The purchaser
at foreclosure sale is entitled to the rents as against the lessor or
his assignee.2 But if the mortgagee had notice prior to the execu-
tion of the mortgage that the mortgagor had assigned the rents,
he takes subject to the assignment, for the reason that the mort-
2Enos v. Cook, 65 Cal. 175, 3 Pac. 632 (1884) Heaton v. Grant Lodge,
55 Ind. App. 100, 103 N. E. 488 (1913)
*Fahrenbraker v. E. Clemens Horst Co., 209 Cal. 7, 284 Pac. 905 (1930).
G roos & Co. v. Chittim, 100 S. W 1006 (Tex. 1907) Fahrenbraker v.
E. Clemens Horst Co., note 2, supra, contra.
the mortgage debtor, his heirs or assigns, as a home. * * * 3. That as to
any action suspended. by this act the statute of limitations of this state
for the commencement of actions shall be extended accordingly. 4. That
an emergency exists and this act shall take effect immediately."
Senate Bill No. 4, Extraordinary Session, Legislature of the State
of Washington, 1933: "* * * 1. In any action heretofore brought or which
may be brought hereafter to foreclose real estate mortgages, the court
may, upon application of defendant upon such terms as may be just to
all paities stay such proceedings for such period or periods finally
ending not later than April 1, 1935 as to court shall deem just and
equitable in view of -the circumstances of the particular case. * * * 3. In
every case where a mortgage foreclosure sale upon execution * * * the
period of redemption may be extended for a period of not more than
two years from the date of such sale, but in no case shall the period, of
redemption be extended beyond April 1, 1935, and then only upon such
terms and conditions as will be just to all parties. * * * 7. The Governor
of the State of Washington shall have power on or after the first day
of April, 1934, by proclamation, to suspend the operations of this act or
any section thereof * * *"
It is interesting to speculate as to what would have been the fate
of these statutes had they been adopted. The form suggested in House
Bill No. 150 would have undoubtedly have been declared unconstitutional.
It has merit in that it declared the emergency to exist, that it should
be of definite duration, and that its application should be to mortgaged
property occupied as a home. It would have been open to attack because
it failed to protect the mortgagee during the period of extension, because
it was an impairment of the obligation of contract, and because it was
a deprivation of property without due process of law Senate Bill No.
4, while not so obviously unconstitutional as House Bill No. 150, is ob-
jectionable because it was not limited in application to farm or home
property because it made no provision for the protection of the mort-
gagee during the period of extension, although it did make the period
of extension d-iscretionary with the court. The attempt in section 6 to
have the statute apply to cases already pending is especially bad. The
Washington proposals wisely provided for revocation of the court's order
of suspension of the usual statutory proceedings as to foreclosure on a
showing that the suspension order was not adequately dealing with the
situation and for the suspension of the operation of the entire statute
upon the proclamation of the Governor that the emergency had passed
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gagee acquires only the rights of the mortgagor. This rule is fol-
lowed in Washington. ' The recent case of Security Savwngs & Loan
Society v. Dudley5 purports to overrule the Griffiths case, but can
readily be distinguished on its facts. There the lease was not re-
corded, and the assignment of rents was made after the mortgage
was executed. Hence the court held that the assignee took subject
to the mortgage. While the Griffith case involves an execution sale
rather than a mortgage foreclosure, the same rules apply
If the lease is not recorded, it becomes subject to the mortgage
and is destroyed by foreclosure.6
II. WHEN TE LEASE is EXECUTED AFTER THE MORTGAGE BUT
PRIOR TO THE COMMENCEMENT OF FORECLOSURE
A. Rights between the filing of the Lis Pendens and the Sale.
The mere filing of a foreclosure action does not terminate a
lease, even though the lease may be subject to the mortgage.7 The
early New York rule that the tenancy was terminated has been
changed by several recent cases.8
Hence the principal problem which arises is the right to the
rent pendente lite. The general rule is that the mortgagor is enti-
tled to the rent earned during that period. If it does not become
due until some later date, it will be apportioned between the mort-
gagor and the purchaser at the foreclosure sale, according to when
it was earned.9 This conflicts with the general rule that rent will
not be apportioned, but rests upon the construction placed upon
the statutes relating to mortgage foreclosures. If a receiver is ap-
pointed, he has a right to the rent superior to that of the mortga-
gor. The receiver is bound by the terms of the lease, and cannot
collect any more rent than that agreed upon between the lessee
and lessor.'0 If the lessee paid the rent in advance, before default
by the mortgagor, he may remain in possession without paymg any
further rent to the receiver." He is treated as having purchased
a leasehold interest in the property But it is held in some states
that a lessee subject to a mortgage pays rent in advance at his
peril, and is liable to the receiver for the reasonable value of the
use and occupation.12 In view of the recent decisions in New York,
Griffith v. Burlingame, 18 Wash. 429, 51 Pac. 1059 (1898)
575 Wash. Dec. 42, 26 Pac. (2d) 384 (1933).
8 Troptcal Investment Co. v. Brown, 45 Cal. App. 205, 187 Pac. 133
.(1919)
'Blodgett Loan Co. -v. Hansen, 86 Mont. 406, 284 Pac. 140 (1930).
$Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Childs Co., 230 N. Y. 285, 130 N. E. 295,
14 A. L. R. 658 (1921) Prudence Co. v. 160 West Seventy-Third St. Corp.,
260 N. Y. 205, 183 N. E. 365 (1932) Bank of Manhattan Trust Co. v. 2166
Broadway Corp., 237 App. Div. 734, 262 N. Y. S. 730 (1933).
'Blodgett Loan Go. v. Hansen, note 7, supra, Clarke v. Cobb, 121 Cal.
595, 54 Pac. 74 (1898) Dolin v. Wachter 87 Mont. 466, 288 Pac. 616
1930) Roberts v. State, 75 Wash. Dec. 131, 26 Pac. (2d) 903 (1933).
10 Prudence Co. v. 160 West Seventy-Thtrd St. Corp., note 8, supra, Bank
of Manhattan Trust Co. v. 2166 Broadway Corp., note 8, supra. Nor can
.the receiver agree with the lessee that he should pay less than the rent
stipulated in the lease. Markantonzs v. Madlan Realty Corp., 262 N. Y.
354, 186 N. E. 862 (1933).
n Sdth v. Cushatt, 199 Iowa 690, 202 N. W 548 (1925) Ottman v.
Cheney, 204 Wis. 56, 234 N. W 325 (1931) Grether v. Nick, 193 Wis. 503,
213 N. W 304 (1927).
"State ex rel Coker v. District Court, 159 Okla. 10, 11 Pac. (2d) 495
(1932), Fletcher -v. McKeon, 71 App. Div. 278, 75 N. Y. S. 817 (1902).
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it is doubtful whether that state would now adhere to that rule.
The only reason for this latter rule is that it prevents the mort-
gagor from fraudulently depriving the mortgagee of the rents by
taking a payment in advance.
If the mortgage contains a valid pledge of the rents and profits,
the mortgagor loses his right to the rent when foreclosure begins. 3
Here again it is a simple matter for the mortgagor to defeat the
rights of the mortgagee. If he assigns the rents to a third party
before the foreclosure action is begun, the assignee is entitled
thereto as against the mortgagee. 4 But an assignment after fore-
closure has commenced is too late, since then the rights of the
mortgagee have attached and any transfer is subject to his lien. 5
The mortgagee has a lien on all rent in the hands of the mortgagor
when suit is started, which extends to rental notes transferred
thereafter to a purchaser with notice.1
B. Rights during period of redemption.
The rights of the parties during the period of redemption are
almost wholly regulated by statute. The statutory provisions differ
in nearly every state, but there is enough similarity so that deci-
sions from other jurisdictions are often valuable.
Although there is a conflict of authority, the best rule is that
a lease is not affected by the foreclosure sale.' 7 The reason for this
rule is that if it were held that the lease was terminated by the
sale a mortgagor who redeemed would discover that he had lost
his lease.' Clearly such a result would be unjust.
The general rule, in the absence of statute, is that the mortgagor
is entitled to the rents during the period of redemption." By stat-
ute in Arizona, California, Montana and Washington the purchaser
is given the right to rents during this period. 0 A similar statute
existed in North Dakota, but was repealed in 1919. 2  However,
he is not entitled to all rents then falling due, but only that earned
since the sale. It will be apportioned.'2 If the lessee has paid rent
in advance, the purchaser can require him to pay it again.2 3 If
the mortgagor subsequently redeems from the sale, the statutes
provide that the purchaser must account to him for the rents
collected.
"Hakes v. North, 199 Iowa 995, 203 N. W 238 (1925) G'rether 'v. Nick,
note 11, supra.
1"Hakes v. North, note 13, supra.
WFerguson v. White, 213 Iowa 1053, 240 N. W 700 (1932)
"Ferguson v. White, note 15, supra; John Hancock Mutual Life Ins.
Co. 'v. Stowe, 215 Iowa 324, 245 N. W 295 (1932).
'-Reynolds v. Lathrop, 7 Cal. 43 (1857) Chadbourn v. Rahilly, 34
Minn. 346, 25 N. W 633 (1885) Dolin v. Wachter note 9, .supra, Wil-
liard v. Campbell, 91 Mont. 493, 11 Pac. (2d) 782 (1932) Virges v. Greg-
ory Co., 97 Wash. 333, 166 Pac. 610 (1917) Contra: Miller v. Lazng, 212
Iowa 437, 236 N. W 378 (1931) Tyler v. Hamnilton, 62 Fed. 187 (C. C.
Ore.) (1894) 14 A. L. R. 664, note.
18 Virges v. Gregory Co., note 17, supra.
1 JONES ON MORTGAGES, sec. 2127 Farm Mortgage Loan Co. v. Pettet,
51 N. D. 491, 200 N. W 497 (1924)
11R. S. A. 1913, Civil Code, Par. 1383; Code of Civ. Proc., sec. 707
Revised Codes 1921, sec. 9448; Wash. Rem. Rev Stat. Ann., sec 600, 602.
2" Farm Mortgage Loan Co. v. Pettet, note 19, supra.
21 Note 9, supra.
2McDevitt v. Sullivan, 8 Cal. 593 (1857).
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This right to the rents is purely statutory, so a prior assignment
by the mortgagor will not defeat the rights of the purchaser.
24 It
is interesting to note that the North Dakota case disapproves the
reasoning of the Washington case of Griffith v. Buriingame, which
was recently repudiated by the Washington court itself.2 5
C. Rights after the period of redemption has expired.
The general rule is that a lease subject to a mortgage is termi-
nated when the purchaser at the foreclosure sale gets the deed,
if the lessee was joind in the foreclosure action.2 6 The lessee may
sue the lessor for breach of the covenant of quiet enjoymentY.2
This cause of action accrues as'soon as the lessee is joined in the
foreclosure action, and if possible the lessee should claim his dam-
ages from the surplus left after the foreclosure sale.
2 8
If the lessee is not joined in the foreclosure action, the lease is
not affected by it or by the deed to the purchaser.2 9 The lessee
must pay the rent stipulated in the lease to the purchaser from the
date he is given notice that the deed has been delivered. 0 But the
purchaser has no greater rights than the lessor, and is not entitled
to any rent if the lessee paid it to the lessor in advance. 1
A few jurisdictions held that the lease is terminated by fore-
closure even though the lessee is not joined in the foreclosure ac-
tion.2 2 The only effect of failure to join the lessee is in the remedy
to be pursued by the purchaser to gain possession of the property 83
It follows naturally that in these jurisdictions the lessee can sue
the lessor for breach of the covenant of quiet enjoyment when
the mortgage is foreclosed.3 4
III. W p THE LEASE IS EXECUTED BETWEEN THE FILING OF THE
FORECLOSuRE AFCTION AND THE FORECLOSURE SAE.
When a lease is executed pendente lite, the lessee takes subject
Shrntaffer v. Bank of Italy, 216 Cal. 243, 13 Pac. (2d) 668 (1932)
Patrick & Co. v. Knapp, 27 N. D. 100, 145 N. W 598 (1914) Security
Savings d- Loan Soczety v. Dudley, note 5, supra, Roberts v. State, note 9,
supra.
Security Saings & Loan Society v. Dudley, note 5, supra.
Sullivan v. Supertor Court, 185 Cal. 133, 195 Pac. 1061 (1921) 14
A. L. R. 664, note; Munday v. O'Neil, 44 Neb. 724, 63 N. W 32 (1895).
Contra: First Trust Toint Stock LWn Bank v. Ingels, 251 N. W 630 (Iowa
1933).
Standard Livestock Co. v. Bank of CaRfornta, N. A., 67 Cal. App. 381,
227 Pac. 962 (1924)
" Stanc arc Livestock Co. v. Bank of California, N. A., note 27, supra.
"Title Ins. & Trust Co. v. Pfenning-Hausen, 57 Cal. App 655, 207
Pac. 927 (1922) Dundee Naval Stores Co. v. McDowell, 65 Fla. 15, 61 So.
108, Ann. Cas. 1915A, 387 (1913) Wheat v. Brown, 3 Kan. App. 431, 43
Pac. 807 (1896) Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Childs Co., note 8, supra,
Markautonis v. Madlan Realty Corp., note 10, supra, 14 A. L. R. 664, note.
"Title Ins. & Trust Co. v. Pfenning-Hausen, 57 Cal. App. 655, 207
v. Brown, note 29, supra, Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Childs Co., note 8,
supra, Markantonts v. Madlan Realty Corp., note 10, supra.
" Stellar Holding Corp. v. Berns, 143 'Misc. 781, 257 N. Y. S. 369 (1932).
"Dolese v. Bellows-Olautle Neon Co., 261 Mich. 57, 245 N. W 569
(1932) B. F Avery & Sons' Plow Co. v. Knnerly, 12 S. W (2d) 140
(Tex. 1929).
23Dolese v. Bellows-Claude Neon Co., note 32, supra.1 B. F Avery & Sons' Plow Co. v. Kennerly, note 32, supra.
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to any order which may be entered in the foreclosure action. He
must pay rent to the receiver, even though he has paid the rent
in advance." Of course, the purchaser at the sale is entitled to the
rent in the same manner as if the lease were executed before fore-
closure began.3 6 A lease of this sort is terminated when the pur-
chaser at the foreclosure sale gets the deed, even though the lessee
was not made a party to the foreclosure.3 7
There are several cases involving leases executed between the
foreclosure decree and the sale. If the decree provided that the
purchaser should have possession during the period of redemption
the lessee cannot attack it collaterally and is liable to the purchaser
for the value of the use and occupation of the land if he remains
in possession. 8 The lease is not terminated by the sale, and the
purchaser is entitled to the rent earned thereafter. 39 It is no de-
fense that the lessee had paid in advance for the whole term.40
IV WHEN THE LEASE IS EXECUTED DURING THE PERIOD
OF REDEMPTION
There are very few cases in which this situation has arisen, and
the decisions are not entirely harmonious. If a lessee plants crops
the assurance that the lessor will redeem, he does so at his peril
and has no rights thereto if they do not mature before the pur-
chaser gets his deed.4 But if the crop is harvested, the purchaser
is entitled to that portion which was payable to the lessor as rent,
even as agaist an innocent purchaser.4 2 In Montana the purchaser
is entitled to possessoin unless the mortgagor occupies the prem-
ises as a home, and may bring ejectment against the lessee.43
If the property is leased by the purchaser at the sale, a mort-
gagor who redeems is entitled to the benefit of the lease.44
CONCLUSION.
Generally, it may be said that a lease is not affected until the
deed passes to the purchaser at the foreclosure sale. If the lessee
is not joined, the proceedings do not affect the lease in any way
When the right to the rent during the period of redemption is
conferred on the purchaser at the foreclosure sale, the mortgagor
cannot defeat that right by an assignment of the rents or by
accepting a payment in advance. Nor can he defeat the right of
a receiver by executing a lease during foreclosure and collecting
rent in advance. GEORGE V POWELL.
15 Gaynor v. Blewett, 82 Wis. 313, 52 N. W 313 (1892) See Flynn v.
Lowrance, 110 Okla. 150, 236 Pac. 594 (1925).
"W7zithed v. St. Anthony etc. Co., 9 N. D. 224, 83 N. W 238 (1899).
"McDermott v. Burke, 16 Cal. 580 (1860).
"Kester v. AmOn, 81 Mont. 1, 261 Pac. 288 (1927)8 First National Bank v. Maxey, 34 Ariz. 438, 272 Pac. 641 (1928).
See Millingar v. Foster 293 S. W 249 (Tex. 1927) 8 S. W (2d) 514,
Condon v. Marley, 7 Kan. App. 383, 51 Pac. 924 (1898) contra.
'
0 Harms v. Foster 97 Cal. 292, 32 Pac. 246 (1893).
"Hendrcks v. Stewart, 53 N. D. 513, 206 N. W 790 (1926)
"Kusper v. Miller 53 N. D. 711, 207 N. W 489 (1926)
"3Dyer v. ,Schmit, 67 Mont. 6, 213 Pac. 1117 (1923).
"People's Sawzngs Bank v. McCarthy, 209 Iowa 1283, 228 N. W 7
(1929)
